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SUMMARY 
The federal government has pledged to update Canada’s official development 
assistance (ODA) policy and this paper examines the potential important 
role of remittances in the development program. Remittances can serve as 
a significant form of cross-border capital flows and can have sizable effects 
on both the sending and receiving countries. This policy piece provides an 
overview of trends in global remittances and gives a context for the policy 
discussion on the relationship between remittances and ODA. The paper 
discusses the primary reasons behind global remittances and their impacts 
on sending and receiving countries, with a particular emphasis on Canada, the 
United States and Mexico. Past findings provide insight into the reasons and 
impacts of remittances on both developed and developing countries. Within 
the context of Canada, the paper also examines how remittances have been 
able to complement and possibly drive other development reform efforts 
domestically and abroad. The goal of the analysis is to help inform the policy 
discussion in Canada and concludes with a set of policy recommendations 
for the Canadian federal government.
1I. INTRODUCTION
In 2016, countries around the world received nearly $600 billion in funds in the form of 
remittances. International remittances are financial transfers that households receive from 
individuals living and working in other countries. They may originate from formal or informal 
channels, and often come in the form of cash or in-kind transfers. For many countries, the amount 
of remittances received each year is greater than official development assistance and foreign direct 
investment and can play a vital role in the recipient country’s development. Electronic transfers 
made through money wiring companies, the banking sector and electronic cash on cellphones or 
other financial institutions are becoming more prevalent and the cost for these services has come 
down. However, in some cases, informal mechanisms based on migrant networks are used and 
individuals are paid fees to carry cash or goods across borders.
The evolution of the transmission method of delivery and the magnitude of the remittances are 
becoming increasingly relevant around the world – from small island economies to large developed 
countries. The flow of funds has implications for policy-makers and other non-governmental 
institutions. Nonetheless, very few countries promote or have directed policies in place to enhance 
the possible productive uses of remittances. The Canadian government could revise the current ODA 
policy to include funding as a means to facilitate transfers out of Canada and to boost outcomes in 
receiving countries. As of 2016-2017, the Canadian government disbursed approximately $5 billion 
of ODA in over 100 countries to help the poorest and most vulnerable, and support fragile states; 
to promote gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls; and to help build a more 
inclusive, peaceful and prosperous world (Global Affairs Canada, 2017). We believe that additional 
funding to promote more remittances could help achieve these development goals.
In this paper, we discuss recent trends in worldwide remittance flows with a particular focus on the 
experiences of Canada, Mexico and the United States, which are interconnected in international 
trade and labour markets. Recent talks about the future state of NAFTA regarding the flows of 
labour, capital, and goods and services could impact the flow of funds from labour services if 
push-and-pull factors for migration are altered. Thus, we feel it is important to talk about Canadian 
remittances in the context of all three countries (Palmer-Rubin, 2018; Webber, 2018). 
As we document below, remittance patterns between these countries are quite different. The U.S. 
and Canada are large sending countries of annual remittances, while Mexico has a rich and well-
documented history of receiving large amounts of remittances each year. Given the importance 
of remittances in Mexico, there is a sizable academic literature on both the determinants and 
impacts of remittances at the household and macroeconomic levels in Mexico. Results from those 
studies have informed economists and policy-makers around the world. More specifically, the 
experiences of several decades of remittances in Mexico can shed light on the impact of current 
remittance streams from Canada to China, India and the Philippines. We discuss in detail the 
various determinants of remittances, analyze their impacts on other recipient and sending countries 
and connect how those findings may inform the causes and effects of remittances from Canada. We 
assess the possible micro- and macroeconomic consequences of remittances and shed light on the 
implications for development reform efforts in Canada. In our concluding section, we delineate a 
set of policy recommendations for Canada. 
Our key questions are: How do remittances impact Canada as a net remittance-sending country 
and how can policy promote the positive aspects of these largely outbound transfers generated from 
immigrants residing in the host country of Canada? To date, ODA policy in Canada as it relates 
to immigration has primarily focused on refugee protection and resettlement; meanwhile, the 
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help empower all women and girls (Government of Canada, 2018). We believe that governments 
can facilitate more remittances abroad which can reduce poverty, promote human rights and lend 
support to “the poorest and most vulnerable, particularly women and girls in all of their diversity.” 
Marie-Claude Bibeau, Minister of International Development and La Francophonie, emphasized 
this goal in the 2016-2017 Report to Parliament on the Government of Canada’s Official 
Development Assistance. 
We document that even though remittances may not have large macroeconomic impacts for most 
receiving countries (with the exception of small recipient countries), the micro-level effects of 
remittances on households can be positive and significant, leading to increased investment in 
education, health care and local infrastructure, along with helping impoverished households meet 
basic needs. In addition, remittances serve as important insurance mechanisms for households 
worldwide so that the promotion of remittances in Canada can help families around the world 
protect themselves against economic uncertainty, especially in Asia where the majority of 
remittances are sent.
II. TRENDS IN REMITTANCES
As evident in Figure 1 below, the annual flow of worldwide remittances has dramatically increased 
in the last decade, from approximately $326 billion in 2006 to $573 billion in 2016 (using data from 
the World Bank). In 1970, global remittances totalled just under $2 billion. With the exception of 
sizable setbacks during the global financial crisis in 2008-2009 and a small decline in 2016 due to 
reduced remittances to developing countries, total remittances have increased almost every year 
since 1970 in both nominal and real terms. It is important to note that a significant share of the 
increase is due to better accounting (central banks are keeping better track of remittances) and the 
increased use of formal channels (e.g., wire transfers). 
While remittances have important implications for Canada, the U.S. and Mexico, their levels, 
shares and direction of flows vary considerably across the three countries. As evident in Figure 2, 
there have been dramatic increases in remittance outflows originating in the U.S. and Canada since 
1970, with the largest increases occurring since the early 2000s. The U.S. is the largest sending 
country of worldwide remittances in terms of sheer dollar amounts, with an outflow of more than 
$70 billion estimated for 2016, while Canada has an annual outflow of approximately $5 billion. 
In contrast, the U.S. receives annual inflows of approximately $6.5 billion while Canada receives 
remittances of $1.3 billion (in 2016 nominal dollars). This makes both Canada and the U.S. net 
senders, as they send significantly more to the rest of the world than they receive each year. On the 
other hand, for the past several decades Mexico has faced difficult economic and political situations 
relative to the U.S. and Canada. Mexican wages are considerably lower and problems associated 
with unemployment, crime and corruption have pushed a large population of residents abroad with 
a sizable share comprised of undocumented immigrants. The World Bank estimates that in recent 
years, Mexico has received approximately $28 billion per year in annual remittances, but is sending 
very few remittances abroad (under $1 billion per year). 
It is clear that remittances are having an impact in all three countries despite the differences in 
absolute magnitudes. In Table 1, we provide remittance inflows and outflows relative to gross 
domestic product (GDP). Remittance outflows for the U.S. and Canada are approximately the 
same once we factor in population size and represent 0.31 per cent of GDP for Canada and 
30.36 per cent for the U.S. in 2016 (even though the levels were 12 times larger in the U.S. than 
Canada). Remittance inflows are actually larger in Canada as a percentage of GDP, at 0.09 per 
cent compared to 0.04 per cent for the U.S., suggesting they are having a slightly larger impact in 
Canada. Not surprisingly, Mexico stands out in relative terms as remittance inflows represent 2.74 
per cent of GDP. In general, the literature suggests that remittances are having a negligible impact 
at the macroeconomic level, even in countries that receive many of them. Still, there are important 
microeconomic effects for households that regularly receive remittances from abroad, as we 
document below.
It is also interesting to analyze which countries receive remittances from Canada. Table 2 
documents the top 10 countries that receive the most remittances from Canada, using the World 
Bank’s bilateral estimates from 2015. Migrants in Canada have sent the largest amounts to Asian 
economies in recent years, namely to China and India. Approximately 18 per cent (or $4 billion 
annually) of remittance outflows from Canada go to China, followed by 11.5 per cent (or $2.7 
billion) to India and another nine per cent ($2 billion) to the Philippines. As is the case with most 
remittance-sending countries, the primary destination countries for Canadian remittances closely 
align with the origin countries of Canada’s migrant population. In fact, Asian countries are the 
largest and fastest growing sources of migration to Canada, as documented in a recent Canadian 
International Development Platform (2016) report. Importantly, approximately two-thirds of all 
remittances from Canada go to developing countries. This aligns with the goals of ODA policy 
and emphasizes the potential role that enhanced remittances could have in advancing the economic 
outcomes of those receiving funds from Canada.
At the microeconomic level, there is significant evidence to indicate that individual migrants send 
a sizable share of their income back to their countries of origin. Estimates range from 10 to 50 per 
cent of foreign-based earnings being sent back home, depending on the migrant’s country of origin 
(Yang, 2011a). In addition, remittances are often sent via small, frequent amounts during the year. 
This sort of behaviour is typical as it reduces the chances that money transfers will be lost or stolen 
and helps smooth family members’ consumption in the source country. According to Chowdhury 
and Das (2016a), Chinese immigrants in Canada remitted $3,111 per year while Indian immigrants 
remitted $3,679 on average in 2000-2002. Loxley et al. (2015a), find that African immigrants in 
Canada sent similar amounts ranging from $2,438 per year to $6,964 by family income category.
As for the method of transfer, it is now relatively more common for migrants to send their 
remittances electronically using a wire transfer payment system (through banks, credit unions 
or wire transfer companies) rather than using informal means. Remittance fees average about 
seven per cent of the funds sent of total remittances worldwide (World Bank, 2010) and estimates 
of elasticities suggest that the amount sent is responsive to the fee structure for money transfers. 
Wire transfer companies have been under attack for their predatory pricing in recent years; as a 
result, reforms have been instituted so that migrants receive better information at the time of the 
transaction. In addition, there has been an increase in the number of institutions (including banks 
and credit unions) that have been willing to work with migrants to open chequing and savings 
accounts. These companies have also faced competition with phone-based money transfer systems 
and the overall increase in supply of wiring service options (as seen by a shift out in the supply of 
transfer service providers). This has lowered the costs of remitting and increased the funds moving 
across borders. As of 2009-2010, Loxley et al. (2015b) found that Canadian remittances to Nigeria, 
Uganda, Senegal and Kenya were largely sent through Western Union (45 per cent), followed by 
banks (18 per cent), and that almost 15 per cent of remitters delivered their remittances themselves. 
Estimates of fees as of 2014 were relatively high for Western Union and Money Gram. According 
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and South Asia.
Mobile banking through phone-based transfers has the most promise in terms of accessibility 
and lowering costs. It already has been one of the most important trends in worldwide remittance 
transactions. Many individuals use cellphones to conduct financial transactions, and the 
transactions can occur anytime, anywhere – even in remote locations in developing countries 
where banks are not available. For example, M-PESA is a mobile banking system in many 
countries throughout Africa and Asia that allows users to make payments and transfers using their 
cellphones. M-PESA has been in place for over a decade and has significantly reduced the costs and 
barriers of transferring funds between individuals. In Asia, WeChat is becoming a popular method 
of sending money through the WeRemit feature. For example, Filipino workers in Hong Kong have 
been able to send funds through WeChat since early 2017, allowing them to avoid the fees and 
time spent sending money through money transfer institutions. Alipay, China’s leading third-party 
payment provider, offers another option for remittance transfers for those with Alipay accounts. If 
both parties have accounts with Alipay, transfers can be conducted without any fees. 
Blockchain technology, such as bitcoin, could also potentially lower the transaction costs associated 
with remittances. However, there are some significant hurdles, including the lack of access to these 
technologies for migrant populations. In addition, there may be a lack of general understanding 
and trust of these systems, which do not allow for point-to-point transactions as traditional wire 
transfer systems do. Wu (2018) identifies other implementation challenges that are unique to the 
blockchain model, including the need to identify corridors of limited liquidity for fiat-bitcoin pairs, 
difficulty finding and maintaining banking relationships and the high costs of compliance. As of 
2014, approximately 70 per cent of all remittance services conducted in Canada were using cash-
to-cash and account-to-account products, demonstrating a reliance on more traditional (and more 
expensive) money transfer methods rather than online or mobile services (Global Partnership for 
Financial Inclusion, 2017a). Thus, a marketing campaign that promotes the use of more efficient 
cash transfer technologies could be implemented.
III. DETERMINANTS AND IMPACT OF REMITTANCES AT THE HOUSEHOLD LEVEL
Several theories have been posited and tested regarding the reason for sending remittances both 
internationally and internally. On net, they suggest that there is considerable heterogeneity within 
and across countries and cohorts. Nonetheless, we review several of the more prominent below and 
discuss evidence supporting these theories.1 Typically, these models involve a utility-maximizing 
migrant or household that chooses to send remittances when the net benefits outweigh the costs 
or when doing so increases expected utility. Therefore, the underlying reason for migrating is to 
increase one’s earnings abroad and to likely relax the budget constraint for the family members 
back home. The reason for doing so can be complicated by demographic, geographic, cultural, 
religious and economic conditions that vary between the two locations. 
Altruism: One of the most widely cited reasons for sending funds is for altruistic reasons with the 
goal of remaining linked to one’s family left behind (Stark, 1991a). In altruism models, utility is 
not only a function of one’s consumption, but also of the spending of family members back home. 
The migrant’s earnings are shared and can be linked to the economic conditions of both countries. 
Typically, these links will decrease over time.
1 
The next two sections that discuss the determinants and impacts of remittances are developed from material presented in 
our textbook The Economics of Immigration (2015).
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abroad to earn income that is not linked to the economic conditions back home and to allow for 
consumption smoothing. This diversification alleviates the concentration of income sources and 
helps to maintain a steady source of household income (Rosenzweig and Stark, 1989). Both the 
models of altruism and consumption smoothing suggest that there will be more funds transferred 
when the economy worsens in the source country. Along these lines, migrant flows are responsive 
to business cycles. Mandelman and Zlate (2012) suggest that remittance flows are procyclical – 
remittances increase when the destination country is in an expansion and fall during recessions. 
Thus, policy-makers in Canada should monitor macroeconomic fluctuations in migrants’ primary 
origin countries, as they may impact remittance flows. 
Target Saving: Some individuals migrate to accumulate funds to help pay for a specific investment 
or large purchase in the source country. Some researchers call this a self-interest theory as 
immigrants go abroad largely with specific purposes that benefit themselves directly. In this case, 
the migrant decides to leave typically for a period to help set aside a certain amount of financial 
assets that are pre-determined before departure. These can range from starting a business back 
home, to purchasing land, to funding a ceremonial event, to paying for health-care expenditures 
for those in need. In this framework, it is anticipated that the migrant will only settle temporarily 
in the host country and will return to the sending country once the funds have been accumulated. 
For Canada, assessing which group has target savings in mind as a goal would be useful in terms of 
guaranteeing access to savings vehicles and financial literacy in order to keep these funds safe and 
to help them possibly earn interest. 
Insurance: Sending remittances may serve as a type of insurance in case the decision to migrate 
did not turn out as expected. The decision to migrate can be modelled with uncertainty which may 
include the likelihood of finding a job, and particularly for undocumented migrants, the possibility 
of being deported. In this case, having sent some money back home can ensure a warmer welcome 
upon one’s return and help maintain good standing within the family. Another insurance channel 
for migrants is to build precautionary savings back home via remittances. Thus, remittances 
could be used to self-insure return migration in the case of unexpected negative outcomes in the 
migration experience. Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2005, 2006) provide models of insurance and 
precautionary saving in this context. Remittances will be larger for those facing greater uncertainty 
and for those who are in the early stages of the migration experience. Those who have developed 
deep roots in the receiving country and have not suffered a negative shock upon arrival may be less 
inclined to send remittances over time. Thus, remittance patterns for Canadian migrants change 
over time, which is important to understand in policy discussions as certain migrant populations 
could be targeted if the goal is to facilitate remittances abroad.
Loan Repayment: The last channel discussed here is the use of remittances to pay back loans, 
particularly those for transportation from the source to the host country. Migration costs can be 
substantial, particularly those that involve a plane ticket and a considerable distance of travel. 
Often, migration entails an upfront cost and when numerous family members migrate, one migrant 
may save to pay the travel costs of another migrant. In the case of illegal border crossing, fees may 
include substantial payments to a smuggler. Or, for those looking for work in a specific field, the 
employment placement agency may seek upfront travel and job-finding fees. Funds may be needed 
to cover spells of unemployment as well. Without a source of income, a migrant may initially need 
to rely on friends, relatives and money lenders to ease the transition into a job abroad and repay a 
loan (Connell and Brown, 1995). 
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countries that rely on remittances, it should be noted that these motivations are not mutually 
exclusive and there can be a combination of motives that applies to one migrant and not another. 
For example, Stark (1991b) suggests that a migrant may have both altruistic and target-savings 
reasons to remit. Furthermore, the payments may be seen as insurance if the migrant needs to 
return home sooner than expected. Over time, the migrant can become established in the host 
country and support businesses at home.
Studies of the situation in Canada also find that numerous reasons for migrating and remitting are 
valid. A study by Unheim and Rowlands (2012) found that remittance flows from Canada are larger 
if the migrant earns more, is older, has multiple jobs, has an investment in the home country and 
has a small family abroad. On the other hand, they find negative associations between education, 
housing costs and refugee status in Canada (Chowdhury and Das, 2016c).2 Other factors such as 
marital status, gender, religion, region of source, host country and attitudes also make a difference 
in remitting patterns.
Importantly, remittance behaviour depends on the type of immigrant who enters each country. 
While Canada is known for its points-based system, there is also a family reunification category 
and these two classes may result in differing determinants of remittances. On the one hand, 
the points-based immigration policy attracts high-skilled immigrants who tend to have longer 
migration durations and may become less connected to their families back home over time. 
Meanwhile, the family-based preference system, similar to the one used in the U.S., can lead to a 
less-skilled migrant population compared to that in Canada. 
Canadian researchers have found heterogeneity in remittances according to country of origin 
and immigration classification. African immigrants were found to send more funds if they were 
refugees, younger and part of a social organization that sponsored family members (Loxley 
et al., 2015d). According to Chowdhury and Das (2016d), Chinese immigrants tend to arrive 
independently and be categorized as economic class, while Indian immigrants are sponsored by 
their families and classified as family class. When examining remittances across these two groups, 
they find that more educated immigrants are less likely to remit in both groups, but there are 
positive associations between income and remittances. Family-class migrants are more likely to 
send money than their economic-class counterparts. Home-ownership costs in Canada reduce the 
likelihood of remitting for all categories of migrants. 
For Chinese immigrants, gender affects remittance behaviour but marital status does not; in 
addition, younger Chinese immigrants are more likely to send money back home. Importantly 
for policy proposals, Chinese immigrants are more likely to send money if they already have 
savings back home. However, there are important differences for Indian immigrants, according to 
Chowdhury and Das (2016e). Married Indian immigrants are more likely to send money back to 
India. Also, having immediate and extended family in Canada boosts the chances of remitting back 
to India. This may occur through the influence of role models and peers who already donate funds 
back home through established organizations in Canada and India (Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2004). 
2 
Immigrants enter Canada with various categorizations, such as economic class, family class, provincial nominee, business 
class and refugee class. 
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Micro-level studies in select countries such as Mexico, Ecuador and Nepal have found positive 
links between remittances and health-care usage and outcomes. For Mexico, Amuedo-Dorantes 
and Pozo (2011) find that government spending on the PROGRESA public health-care program 
substitutes for private spending, and remittance spending on health care is concentrated at the 
upper income levels. For Nepal, Chezum, Bansak and Giri (2018) do not find that government 
programs can adequately cover health-care needs, so remittances fill in the gaps. Specifically, the 
authors find a positive link between remittances and health-care spending in Nepal, particularly 
at the lower end of the income distribution. For Ecuador, Ponce et al., (2011) find that remittances 
boost health spending particularly for care on vaccinations and other preventative measures. 
Thus, remittances from Canada are likely having positive effects on health outcomes for recipient 
households. 
One of the tangible benefits of remittances at the household level is financing education 
expenditures. However, the impacts of remittances on education spending and outcomes are 
not clear. If a household facing budget and credit constraints wants to invest more in education, 
additional income from remittances should increase its investment, as found in Adams and 
Cuecuecha (2010, 2013) in Ghana and Guatemala. Hines and Simpson (2017) find a positive 
relationship between remittances and household expenditures on education in Kenya. Alternatively, 
remittances may increase the consumption of food and durable goods but may not change 
investment decisions (such as education). For Mexico, there is no clear linkage between increased 
remittances and increased spending on tuition and books (Airola, 2007). Yang (2011b) notes that 
whether remittances are used for consumption or investment may depend on the household’s 
income. While poor households are likely to spend more on food and durable goods, wealthier 
households can afford to invest in the future via physical or human capital.
Even more complicated is to calculate out the total long-run effects of remittances on educational 
outcomes, as it takes time for these effects to be realized. For Mexico, some studies find increased 
educational attainment and better grades, while others find a disincentive to attend college as 
labour migration to the U.S. becomes more attractive and migration of boys increases housework 
for girls (Borraz, 2005; Hanson and Woodruff, 2003; Kandel and Kao, 2001; McKenzie and 
Rapoport, 2006). For example, Acosta (2006) finds that young children are more likely to be in 
school in El Salvadoran households that receive remittances. In Nepal, remittances lead to a higher 
propensity of being enrolled in school, with the largest effects on boys (Bansak and Chezum, 
2009). Mansour et al., (2011) find remittances have a positive effect on both school attendance and 
educational attainment in Jordan. The resulting investment in human capital will ultimately boost 
individual productivity, wages, happiness and well-being, although these outcomes are difficult 
to quantify at the household level across generations. Thus, it is plausible that remittances from 
Canada are having small, positive effects on educational outcomes for some recipient households.
Last, remittances can lead to financial access and increased investments in the migrant-sending 
countries. Evidence from Mexican household data suggests that this is the case. Using data from 
the Mexican Family Life Survey for 2002 and 2005, Ambrosius (2016) finds that remittances are 
highly correlated with savings accounts and other borrowing options in Mexico. It is likely that 
remittances from Canada provide better access and use of financial services in Canada.
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In this section, we discuss the various macroeconomic impacts of remittances. We consider the 
effects on economic growth, development and poverty alleviation in the receiving country. We then 
analyze the extent to which remittances impact sending countries such as Canada and the U.S.
Given the scale of worldwide remittances, their impacts can be significant for receiving countries, 
particularly for small economies where they can represent a significant share of GDP. Even in larger 
economies, remittances have been shown to play an integral part of economic growth, development 
and poverty alleviation. In standard models of economic growth, total output (or GDP) can grow 
due to increases in labour, physical capital or productivity. Remittances are akin to capital flows, 
so that countries that receive them have access to more capital that may fuel economic growth. 
Remittances may lead to entrepreneurial pursuits, boosting productivity through information 
diffusion or increasing investment.
As discussed above, remittances may be used to invest in education (or human capital). An 
increase in schooling investment within a country will increase worker productivity over the long 
run, leading to more economic growth. However, remittances may be used to buffer household 
income, which could create a disincentive to work among other household members. If this occurs, 
it is plausible that an inflow of remittances may dampen economic growth, leaving the ultimate 
question an empirical one.
Remittances impact the macroeconomic situation of a receiving country through other channels. 
For example, an influx of remittances may put pressure on the local currency, causing it to 
appreciate in value. While a stronger currency is good in terms of attracting foreign capital, 
appreciation will reduce exports, causing a reduction in total output (GDP). This effect, often 
labelled the “Dutch disease”, is particularly harmful for countries that are large exporters. For 
many developing countries, however, remittances are an important source of foreign exchange and 
can alleviate balance-of-trade deficits by financing imports. Households that receive remittances 
have higher income levels and will thereby spend more money on local goods and services. 
Increased household consumption leads to increases in aggregate demand which puts upward 
pressure on prices. Studies find that remittances lead to higher inflation in Latin American 
countries (Ball et al., 2013). Higher incomes lead to more sales and income tax revenues which may 
be used to finance government spending on education, infrastructure, etc.
If remittances are taxed, they can have a direct impact on government budgets. A few countries 
have tried to tax remittances directly, but with little success. Other countries impose indirect taxes 
on remittances by artificially setting the exchange rate on them so that revenues are generated when 
the funds are converted to the local currency. Ethiopia, Pakistan and Venezuela have implemented 
this type of policy on remittance inflows.
Since remittances often lead to positive effects on total output or income, they can be a force in 
poverty alleviation in the receiving country. Adams and Page (2005) document sizable effects 
from remittances in a sample of more than 70 developing countries: they estimate that a 10 per 
cent increase in remittances results in a 3.5 per cent reduction in the share of people living in 
poverty. Remittances can also be an important source of funds to meet subsistence needs. Analysis 
of detailed household surveys from around the world suggests that remittances are often spent on 
necessities such as food, clothing, health care, transportation and housing, rather than luxury items. 
Overall, the evidence on the growth effects of remittances for receiving countries is mixed. As 
noted above, remittances affect economic growth through various channels, making it difficult to 
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country combinations as well as economic conditions (Chami et al., 2008). In a very recent study of 
remittances and growth, Clemens and McKenzie (2018) posit that many complicating factors make 
it difficult to find a positive link between remittances and economic growth. Along these lines, 
the recipient country’s macroeconomic situation is important, especially the structures governing 
monetary and fiscal policy, so currency fluctuations must be carefully considered. Thus, the 
Canadian government should closely monitor the macroeconomic situation of recipient countries 
so that it can better understand the impacts of remittance flows. In some cases, remittances are 
being used to meet basic needs, while in other cases, they may be crowding out other forms of 
investment, which may be detrimental to local economies. The Canadian government could 
collaborate with local governments to better understand how the funds from abroad are being used.
Empirical evidence of the macroeconomic impacts of remittances on remittance-sending countries 
is mixed and depends on the size and level of development of the country receiving sizable 
migrant populations. In many cases such as Canada and the U.S., the absolute size of the outflow 
of remittances in levels seems significant (at $4.7 billion and $66.7 billion, respectively), but as a 
share of GDP only represents less than one-tenth of one per cent of annual GDP for each country. 
For less-developed countries with large migrant populations (such as Indonesia or Thailand), 
the outflow of remittances can have larger effects as the size of the remittances make up a 
significant share of GDP. Some studies have found a positive relationship between remittances and 
macroeconomic factors (Gapen et al., 2009; World Bank, 2006) while other studies find a negative 
relationship or none at all (IMF, 2005). Remittances may reduce domestic savings, hurt domestic 
investment and ultimately weaken the domestic capital stock significantly. Domestic consumption 
may also fall in these countries if the funds leaving the country are large enough to noticeably 
lower aggregate demand and output. In turn, the distribution of wealth in the sending country may 
be altered and inequality may rise because of an outflow of remittances. If migrants send over half 
of their income back to their home countries and live off the remaining funds, those remaining 
funds may be inadequate and unsustainable in the long run. If migrants intend to return home, they 
may also be reluctant to invest in their host country and they could create pockets of poverty in 
neighbourhoods where they temporarily reside.
Recent work by William Olney (2015a) suggests that remittance outflows can lower the wages of 
native workers. This can be seen through a reduction in demand for labour in non-traded domestic 
goods and services markets. If the remittance flows result in lower demand for certain locally 
produced goods and services, demand for labour to produce these items may fall. Using German 
data, Olney (2015b) finds that a one per cent increase in remittances lowers native wages by 0.06 
per cent. Similar studies could be conducted to see if these effects are happening in Asian countries 
that are large recipients of Canadian remittances. 
For large developed countries with significant levels of remittance outflows, most of the effects are 
more likely to be indirect. For example, if current migrant populations are sending large amounts 
of remittances home, at least some of that money is being used to finance the migration of other 
household members. In the U.S. and Canada, such chain migration is also based on network effects 
that lower the cost of migration through knowledge of labour, housing, education and other markets 
which can ease the transition and assimilation into the migrant-receiving country of new migrants. 
Whether these effects – funding for new migrants and chain migration – are net costs or benefits to 
the host country depends on the characteristics of the migrant. This channel is particularly relevant 
in the U.S. where immigration policy is more heavily focused on family-based preferences so that 
migrants can sponsor the migration of other family members over time. In general, however, very 
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little is known about the impact of remittance outflows for the migrant-receiving and remittance-
sending country. This is an area that should garner more researchers’ attention.
V. POLICY AND SUMMARY
As the above discussion suggests, having a particular framework with which to assess the flow of 
funds from a migrant to a household in the source country facilitates a better understanding of the 
impact of the transfers on economic outcomes such as consumption, investment and growth, and 
can help inform government policy in both the sending and receiving countries.
Overall, the literature does not indicate that remittances have large effects on the macroeconomic 
situation of receiving or sending countries. Those that receive remittances appear to benefit and 
those that send them do not appear to be sizably adversely affected. As a result, most advanced 
countries with considerable remittance outflows remain relatively neutral when it comes to 
considering policy that may impact remittances. That is, governments do not usually discourage 
remittances but they also do not set policies to encourage them. However, based on studies using 
micro-level data and recent initiatives by the Canadian government, it seems as if there is some 
interest in promoting remittances as a means of development assistance. These efforts should be 
applauded and if deemed successful, should be considered by other advanced nations. In addition, 
the private sector could provide assistance through financial literacy outreach and the introduction 
of less costly transfer services. Our analysis indicates that more worldwide remittances will lead to 
improved living conditions for recipient households. They will also likely lead to better education 
and health outcomes which will in turn have positive long-term effects on the global economy. 
We offer the following policy recommendations:
Reduce remittance fees and increase oversight of wire transfer services. 
Support: International policy-makers have suggested this as a goal and Canada has already made 
progress towards this end. As of 2011, the G20 leaders committed to reducing the average costs of 
remittances from nine per cent to five per cent and recommitted to these goals in 2016. Canada has 
seen fees fall from 9.3 per cent (in 2015) to 7.8 per cent (in 2017) (Global Partnership for Financial 
Inclusion, 2017b). To further move toward this outcome, the Canadian government is developing a 
website with price comparisons of transaction fees for transferring funds. The government aims to 
improve market competitiveness and to better understand the needs of remittance providers. Part of 
this approach also involves setting caps on total remittance charges, including both transaction fees 
and the exchange rate premium. If the fees are low enough, migrants may not only be able to remit 
more but may be able to switch from informal to safer formal methods of transfers. Banks and 
other financial institutions could partner with the government in this initiative to provide low-cost 
transfer options coupled with financial literacy outreach efforts. Monitoring the new technological 
advances in wire transfer services should also ease fears of possible security breaches and account 
fraud which have plagued online merchants and have raised doubts about the safety of online 
transactions. In terms of reaching certain groups of immigrants in Canada, research has suggested 
that African immigrants in Canada may be the most reliant on Western Union and other expensive 
wiring services, so they may have the most to gain, despite their relatively high use of M-PESA.
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Make it easier for migrants to travel between their source and host countries; 
support migrants in their host countries; mobilize migrants to support their  
home development.
Support: Often, barriers to migration affect the flow of funds across countries. Some migrants 
find it difficult to leave their source countries because of prohibitively high travel expenses and 
the need to hire a placement agency and smuggler. Others feel they cannot return easily due to 
visa restrictions and lack of support upon their return. Border enforcement or confusion over 
proper documentation needed for travel and work purposes may deter migrants from crossing and 
they may be unwilling to travel home if they perceive difficulty in re-entering the host country. 
Differentials in ease of travel and visas needed for economic, refugee and family-class immigrants 
should be taken into consideration as potential barriers that could reduce the sending of remittances 
for investment purposes.
Facilitate the investment of remittance funds toward productive uses.
Support: Some developing countries (e.g., Mexico’s 3x1 program) have experimented with 
programs that match remittances to additional funds to support local development and 
infrastructure projects. In a similar fashion, Canada and the U.S. could encourage foreign countries 
to maximize the effects of their remittances by also providing matched incentives to those willing 
to use funds for investment rather than consumption purchases. Special bank accounts and tax 
relief could also attract funds abroad. These incentives may be of particular importance for Chinese 
immigrants who are more likely to remit if they have investments in their home country. 
Help local policy-makers establish the need for financial services in underserved 
areas and understand the relationship between migration and remittances.
Support: Often, migrant communities appear in locations that are not accustomed to supporting 
their needs and do not understand the importance of remittances and wiring services. Local 
governments should work with banks and other financial institutions to make sure remittance 
services are provided. In particular, India’s Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, which merged 
with that country’s Ministry of External Affairs in January 2016, could work to encourage the 
Indian diaspora and family-class immigrants in Canada to boost transmission of funds to those 
back in India, as they have a higher tendency to remit than economic or business-class migrants 
(Chowdhury and Das, 2016f). Providing estimates on the size of potential markets for remittance 
services can be useful to migrants, their local communities and the financial institutions. 
Recognize the diversity in influences on the decision to remit.
Support: Studies show considerable differences in the propensity to remit based on immigration 
class, country of origin, cultural and religious differences, traditions and opportunities in the 
home country. Additional surveys of immigrants in Canada and their source countries could help 
streamline all of the above levers to enhance productive uses of remitted funds. 
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In millions of U.S. dollars
Source: World Bank Migration and Remittances Data. Accessed Jan. 10, 2018.  
http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaissues/brief/fFfimigration-remittances-data
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TABLE 1  REMITTANCES AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP FOR CANADA, MEXICO AND THE U.S., 2016
Country Remittance outflows  (in millions of 2016 US$) GDP (in millions of 2016 US$) Remittances as a share of GDP (%) 
Canada 4,739 1,529,760 0.31%
Mexico 654 1,046,923 0.06%
United States 66,649 18,624,475 0.36%
Country Remittance inflows  (in millions of 2016 US$) GDP (in millions of 2016 US$) Remittances as a share of GDP (%) 
Canada 1,343 1,529,760 0.09%
Mexico 28,670 1,046,923 2.74%
United States 6,547 18,624,475 0.04%
Source: Same as Figure 1; GDP estimates from World Bank World Development Indicators.
TABLE 2 10 LARGEST DESTINATION COUNTRIES OF CANADIAN REMITTANCES










United States 709 3.0%
Total 23,438  
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